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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This lawsuit stems from the dissolution of a partnership between Plaintiff-Respondent-

Cross Appellant Joseph Guenther (“Guenther”) and Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Respondent
Michelle Ryerson (“Ryerson”). The parties purchased real property in the Boise foothills on which
they intended to develop a vineyard and construct a home. Since 2009, the vineyard has been (and
continues to be) Guenther’s labor of love. He has spent countless hours designing the multi-acre
vineyard and its irrigation system, along with planting, maintaining and harvesting the grape vines.
The partnership dissolved in March 2017, Ryerson moved out of the home on the property, and
Guenther alone has paid the mortgage, paid all utilities, and maintained the home, the vineyard
and its irrigation system. To this day, the property remains an ongoing agricultural operation that
Guenther takes care of alone, with no assistance or contribution from his former partner.
When Ryerson abandoned the partnership, Guenther reviewed the partnerships’ financial
records, which revealed Guenther had made approximately eighty percent (80%) of the out-ofpocket capital contributions to the partnership and Ryerson had contributed twenty percent (20%).
Based on his evaluation of Ryerson’s capital contributions and the $600,000 appraised value of
the partnership’s real property at the time of dissolution, Guenther offered to purchase Ryerson’s
interest in the partnership for $35,617.00 and refinance the loan encumbering the partnership’s
property to release Ryerson from the loan obligation. This was a fair and straightforward solution
to wind up the partnership. Ryerson, however, insisted she was entitled to at least fifty percent
(50%) of the approximately $145,000 of equity in the property, arguing the parties had agreed to
a 50/50 split of profits. The parties could not reach a settlement, and Guenther initiated this action,
seeking judicial dissolution and winding up of the partnership. Ryerson counterclaimed alleging
the existence of an oral partnership agreement that the ownership and profits would be split 50/50.
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After extensive motion practice, the District Court granted Guenther summary judgment,
finding that as of the date of the partnership’s dissolution on March 26, 2017: (1) the value of the
property was $600,000.00, and (2) there was $144,789.92 of equity in the property. Following
trial, the District Court determined that of the total capital contributions to the partnership,
Guenther had made 76% of the contributions and Ryerson had made 24%. Ryerson was therefore
entitled to $34,749.58 of the equity in the property (less than Guenther’s offers of settlement).
However, Ryerson again refused Guenther’s proposed buyout and refinance of the property’s
mortgage loan, insisting the partnership’s real property be sold to a third party on the open market,
despite the resulting waste, delay, and inevitable recovery of less money by Ryerson.
After additional motion practice, the District Court acknowledged that liquidation of the
property would result in significant waste of the partnership’s assets, and therefore it was in the
best interest of the partnership to allow Guenther to buy out Ryerson’s interest and refinance the
mortgage loan. However, due to a misunderstanding of the law related to mortgage loans and
Idaho’s Uniform Partnership Act, the District Court later ruled the property must be listed and sold
by a realtor on the open market, despite the resulting waste and Guenther’s willingness to purchase
the property to preserve his home and substantial investment. Ryerson’s position and the Court’s
ruling take an ongoing agricultural operation with future potential and destroy it, but worse,
needlessly deprive Guenther of his home and life’s work.
B.

Statement of Facts
In 2009, Guenther and Ryerson (collectively, the “Parties”) formed a partnership in order

to acquire, maintain and operate real property for profit. R. p. 782. They did not have a written
partnership agreement. R. p. 782 at ¶ 7. On June 12, 2009, the Parties jointly purchased three
parcels of land (approximately 21.65 acres) in the northwest Boise foothills located at 8571 N.
Lost Sage Lane, Boise, Idaho (the “Property”). R. p. 782 at ¶ 4.
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The Parties used their funds and sweat equity to develop portions of the Property to operate
as a vineyard. Using his specialized vintners training, from 2009 to 2016, Guenther contributed
over 2,000 hours of sweat equity to the partnership, 1 which included significant labor to clean up
the Property, construct a well and irrigation system, and develop and plant a multi-acre vineyard
with the goal of harvesting and selling a variety of grapes and wine. Trial Tr. at 35-92. Guenther
also spent many hours preparing the soil, planting and irrigating the vines, and controlling pests. 2
Id. The first harvest of several thousand pounds of grapes was in the fall of 2016, mere months

before being abandoned by his partner. R. p. 795 at ,-r 98.
At the court trial in April 2018, Guenther testified that much of his sweat equity labor
required expertise, including knowledge related to engineering, construction, plumbing, electrical
work, agriculture, and vineyards. Guenther testified that he has an undergraduate degree in Biology
and a master's degree in Resource Analysis. He currently works as an environmental project
manager at a local engineering firm. Guenther's background gave him the expertise to perform
the well work, install the irrigation system and complete multiple other projects on the Property.
See Trial Tr. at 31-92. In 2015, the Parties obtained a construction loan from Zions Bank and built

a home on the Property. R. p. 786 at ,-r 36; see also R. p. 916 (Zions Bank Note).
The Parties' partnership dissolved on March 26, 2017, and Ryerson moved out of the home
on the Property. R. p. 792-793 at ,-r,-r 77-78. Guenther remained living in the home and continued
to invest significant funds into developing and operating the vineyard. R. p. 187 at 116; R. p. 787

1

R. p. 795 (stating Guenther contributed 2,160 hours of labor from 2009 to 2016, which at the
assigned value of $25 per hour, totaled $54,000). Ryerson contributed only 1,250 hour of labor,
and the majority of her sweat equity related to choosing design elements for the home construction.
R. 797 at ,-r 113; see also Trial Tr. at 177-181.
2

"Guenther's work experience in engineering and as a planner, and his personal experience from
his upbringing on a dairy farm, contributed to the services and value he provided for the
development of the property." R. p. 794 at ,-r 90.
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at ¶ 48. Guenther alone has paid the mortgage, insurance, and maintenance for the Property in its
entirety since May 2017. R. p. 291 at ¶ 9; R. p. 787 at ¶ 47.
Guenther has continued to care for and operate the vineyard since the partnership
dissolution. Developing and operating a vineyard is a long-term investment, which includes
required continued education and near constant upkeep and investment. In the fall of 2017,
Guenther completed a winemaker certificate program through the University of California Davis
for education to learn horticulture and management principles for vineyards. R. p. 789 at ¶ 55.
The program had specific prerequisites, including requiring that applicants have a science
background with certain credits in chemistry. Guenther testified that it took him around two years
to complete the program at a cost of over $10,000.00. Trial Tr. at 42-44.
The Parties agree that the Idaho Uniform Partnership Act, Idaho Code § 30-23-101 et seq.,
(“UPA”) governs the dissolution and winding up of their partnership’s business. The Parties
however disagree on how to wind up the partnership. From the outset of the case, Guenther has
sought to remain in the home on the Property and buy out Ryerson’s partnership interest and/or
purchase the Property from the partnership. In contrast, Ryerson has insisted that in order to
maximize her return on her investment in the partnership, the Property must be sold to a third party
on the open market, despite the economic waste resulting from such a sale and despite her
entitlement to a modest amount of money from the partnership. Ryerson’s position has always
been disconnected from the reality that she is entitled only to her capital contribution in this case.
Prior to filing this lawsuit, Guenther offered to buy out Ryerson’s interest in the partnership
for $35,617.00, and he later increased his offer to $45,000. R. p. 189 at ¶¶ 24-25; R. pp. 170, 174;
R. p. 183. These amounts were based upon Guenther’s evaluation of Ryerson’s contributions to
the partnership. While this offer exceeded the value of Ryerson’s contributions, Guenther was
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willing to pay that amount to resolve the litigation. R. p. 189 at ,r 25. However, Ryerson repeatedly
insisted that she was entitled to fifty percent of the partnership profits, ignoring Plaintiffs provided
analysis of Idaho Code § 30-23-806, which requires repayment of all partner capital contributions
prior to division of any profits. 3 R. pp. 183-84. The Parties were therefore unable to reach any
settlement.
C.

Procedural History
1.

Guenther Files Lawsuit Seeking Judicial Dissolution and Winding Up of the
Partnership; Ryerson Counterclaims based on Oral Partnership Agreement
for 50/50 Split of Profits

Guenther initiated this action on June 20, 2017, and he filed an Amended Complaint on
June 21, 2017. R. p. 60-106. Guenther's Amended Complaint asserted causes of action against
Ryerson for dissolution of the Parties' partnership, unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, and
declaratory judgment/quiet title. Id. On June 29, 2017, Ryerson filed an Answer and Counterclaim,
seeking judicial dissolution of the Parties' partnership alleging the existence of an oral partnership
agreement that the ownership and profits would be split 50/50. R. p. 107-112.
2.

Guenther Prevails on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; Court
Determines Partnership Dissolved on March 26, 2017

After settlement negotiations stalled, Guenther filed a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on September 25, 2017, seeking a declaratory judgment that, pursuant to Idaho Code§
30-23-806, winding up of the Parties' partnership after dissolution requires repayment of all capital
contributions before distribution of any profits. R. p. 119; R. pp. 122-128. While this issue was a
sticking point in settlement negotiations, Ryerson did not oppose the Motion, and on November 3,

3

Rule 408 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence does not require exclusion of evidence relating to offers
to compromise if the evidence being introduced is used to show witness bias or prejudice and the
evidence is not presented for the purpose of showing liability. I.R.E. 408; Soria v. Sierra Pacific
Airlines, Inc., 111 Idaho 594, 726 P.2d 706 (1986).

RESPONDENT AND CROSS-APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 5

2017, the District Court granted Guenther's Motion. R. p. 143; R. p. 285. In addition, the District
Court later held the partnership had dissolved on March 26, 2017. R. p. 367.
3.

Guenther Prevails on Additional Motion for Summary Judgment; Court
Holds the Value of the Partnership's Real Property was $600,000, and
Property had $144,789.93 of Equity in March 2017

Following extensive motion practice, the District Court granted summary judgment for
Guenther for purposes of trial, finding that as of the date of the partnership's dissolution on
March 26, 2017: (1) the value of the Property was $600,000.00, and (2) there was $144,789.92 of
equity in the Property (the difference between the Property value and partnership's mortgage debt
owed to Zions Bank). R. p. 493. The Court denied summary judgment as to the Parties' out-ofpocket and sweat equity capital contributions to the partnership and their percentage share of the
total contributions. Id.
4.

The Parties Testify at Court Trial on their Capital Contributions to the
Partnership and Ryerson's Counterclaim for Oral Partnership Agreement

A court trial was held on April 2 and 3, 2018, during which both Parties testified regarding
their out-of-pocket and sweat equity capital contributions to the partnership; Ryerson also testified
concerning her Counterclaim allegations of an oral partnership agreement to share ownership and
profits 50/50. Trial Tr. at 31-212.
5.

Court Finds that of the Total Capital Contributions, Guenther Contributed
76% Percent and Ryerson Contributed 26%, and that of the Property's
Equity, Guenther is owed $110,040.42 and Ryerson is owed $34,749.58

The District Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law on May 14, 2018
("Order"), holding the Parties' capital contributions to the partnership totaled $431,677.88 through
the date of dissolution. Of the total $431,677.88 in contributions, Guenther contributed 76% and
Ryerson contributed 24%. R. pp. 684-86. Therefore, Guenther's pro rata share of the $144,789.92
of equity in the Property as of the date of dissolution was $110,040.34, and Ryerson's pro rata
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share was $34,749.58. R. p. 688 at ,r 11. The District Court also held "any increase in equity after
March 26, 2017, if any, is attributable to Guenther personally and any expenses or maintenance on
the property after that time are attributable to Guenther at 100 percent." R. p. 682 at

,r 80.

In

addition, the District Court dismissed Ryerson's Counterclaim. R. p. 690 at ,r 29.
6.

Guenther Seeks Clarification of District Court's Order and Seeks to Purchase
the Partnership's Real Property and Buy Out Ryerson's $34,749.58 Interest

Some of the details in the District Court's Order were contradictory and confusing,
including a requirement that the Parties make capital contributions in an amount to satisfy the
partnership's debt to Zions Bank. R. p. 688 at

,r,r

14-17. On May 25, 2018, Guenther filed a

Motion to Clarify, arguing the Order was not consistent with Idaho Code§ 30-23-806, which only
requires contributions from partners "if the partnership's assets are insufficient to satisfy all its
obligations .... " LC. § 30-23-806(c). R. p. 723-30. Moreover, even if the Parties were to make
contributions to the partnership sufficient to pay off the mortgage loan to Zions Bank, they would
still need to sell the Property to receive their pro rata share of the equity. Id. Guenther sought a
more straightforward solution whereby he would purchase the Property and, through the closing,
pay off the Zions Bank loan debt and pay Ryerson her $34,749.58 pro rata equity share. Id. This
solution would avoid waste on the partnership, pay off the partnership loan, compensate Ryerson
for her court ordered capital contribution share, and allow Guenther to continue pursuing his dream
without losing his investment of hours and money. Id. Ryerson agreed the Court should clarify its
requirement that the Parties make cash contributions to satisfy the mortgage debt, but she
continued to assert the Property should be sold on the open market even in the face of receiving
less than her capital contribution if sold in this manner. R. pp. 743-53.
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7.

Court Acknowledges Property Sale to Third Party Would Effect Significant
Waste on the Property and Provides Mechanism for Guenther to Purchase the
Property from the Partnership

On July 2, 2018, the Court entered a Clarification of Conclusions of Law, Memorandum
Decision Reconsidering Liquidation, which acknowledged that listing and selling the Property on
the open market would result in significant waste of the partnership's assets, and therefore it is in
the "best interest of the partnership" to allow Guenther to Purchase the Property. R. p. 773-78.
Specifically, the Court stated:
[T]he Court finds allowing Guenther to purchase the property is in
the best interest of the partnership, the remaining partner, and the
partner that dissociated since Ryerson can only recover $34,749.58
under the Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law. Although
she believes the property's value has escalated since the partnership
dissolved on March 26, 2017, the value of her interest was set at the
time of dissolution and will not increase. However, the value of her
interest can decrease with the passage of time and the extra costs of
the sale on the open market and attorney fees. Therefore, incurring
additional partnership liabilities by retaining a sales agent, paying
closing costs, paying the mortgage and expenses to maintain the real
property until such sale, and paying additional attorney fees wastes
assets for both Ryerson and Guenther and unreasonably prolongs the
winding up.
R. pp. 774-75.
On July 2, 2018, the District Court also entered an Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law (the "Amended Order"). The Amended Order provided a mechanism by which Guenther
could purchase the Property "from the partnership by July 31, 2018 by a refinance with Zions Bank
... " R. p. 804 at 18. The Court stated "[a]ny financing of the property must completely satisfy
the partnership's entire debt to Zions Bank and result in termination of the deed of trust in Joseph
Guenther and Michelle Ryerson's names." R. p. 804 at 110.
The Court entered an Order for Sale of 8571 N. Lost Sage Lane, Boise, Idaho 83714 on
July 13, 2018, which stated it would expire at midnight on July 31, 2018. R. p. 861. On July 30,
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2018, Guenther filed a Motion for Amended Order for Sale of Property, requesting a two-week
extension of the Court's July 31, 2018 deadline to close his purchase of the Property. R. pp. 86368. Despite Ryerson's erroneous and unsupportable implications that Guenther misrepresented to
the Court his approval for financing, such implication is contrary to the court record.

See

Appellant's Brief, pp. 8, 10 and 11. In actuality, Guenther was prepared to close on the sale with
only a nine-day delay, in fact, the day after the hearing on the motion.

R. p. 889 at ,-r 7.

Inexplicably, after acknowledging the waste that the partnership would be exposed to in the event
an open market liquidation occurred, the Court denied the modest time extension request. See
Aug. 8, 2018 Tr. at 15:3-16; see also Sept. 9, 2018 Tr. at 16: 17-17:3 (denying Guenther's Motion
to Reconsider Decision Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Amended Order for Sale of Property). The
only apparent basis for declining the short extension and preventing waste on the partnership was
the Court's misapplication of the partnership statute and a misunderstanding of the mortgage.
8.

Court Determines Guenther is the Prevailing Party but Denies him an
Attorney Fees Award under Idaho Code § 12-120(3)

On May 25, 2018, Guenther filed a Memorandum of Costs and Request for Attorney Fees
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and Rule 54(d)(l)(C). R. p. 694. The District Court ruled
Guenther was the prevailing party but that he was not entitled to his attorney fees under Idaho
Code§ 12-120(3). R. pp. 933-944.
D.

Both Parties Timely File Notices of Appeal

On August 13, 2018, Ryerson filed a Notice of Appeal. R. p. 900. On September 4, 2018,
Guenther filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal. R. p. 929. Guenther also filed an Amended Notice of
Cross-Appeal on September 17, 2018, following denial of Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider and
denial of Plaintiffs requested attorney fees. R. p. 945.
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II.

ISSUES PRESENTED BY GUENTHER

Guenther responds to the issues presented by Appellant Ryerson, and Guenther asserts the
following additional issues on appeal (which overlap some of the issues presented by Ryerson):
1.

Did the District Court err in requiring compliance with Idaho Code § 30-23-703(c)

regarding dissociation of a single partner, including the requirement to obtain “agreement of a
creditor,” for sale of partnership real property to a partner during the winding up and liquidation
of a partnership following dissolution?
2.

Did the District Court err in ordering the sale of partnership real property on the

open market to a third party where such sale would result in significant waste on the partnership?
3.

Did the District Court err in denying Plaintiff attorneys’ fees under Idaho Code §

12-120(3) with respect to the elements of the case based on a commercial transaction?
4.

Is Guenther entitled to attorneys’ fees on appeal?
III.

A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary Judgment.
“This Court reviews a ruling on summary judgment under the same standard as the trial

court.” Hayes v. City of Plummer, 159 Idaho 168, 357 P.3d 1276, 1278 (2015). “Summary
judgment is proper ‘if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c)).
B.

Motion to Reconsider.
“When a district court decides a motion to reconsider, ‘the district court must apply the

same standard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is being
reconsidered.’” Westby v. Schaefer, 157 Idaho 616, 621, 338 P.3d 1220, 1225 (2014) (quoting
Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012)).
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C.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
“The review of a trial court’s decision after a court trial is limited to ascertaining ‘whether

the evidence supports the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions
of law.’” Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018) (quoting
Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., 143 Idaho 733, 737, 152 P.3d 604, 608 (2007)).
This Court will “liberally construe the trial court’s findings of fact
in favor of the judgment entered, as it is within the province of the
trial court to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and judge
the credibility of witnesses.” This Court will not disturb findings of
fact on appeal that are supported by substantial and competent
evidence, even if there is conflicting evidence at trial. Only
erroneous findings will be set aside.
Green River Ranches, LLC v. Silva Land Co., LLC, 162 Idaho 385, 389, 397 P.3d 1144, 1148
(2017) (citations omitted). As to conclusions of law, these are “freely reviewed” and, thus, subject
to the appellate court “drawing its own conclusions from the facts presented in the record.” Id.
D.

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs.
Whether the gravamen of the lawsuit is a commercial transaction implicating a fee award

under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) is a question of law over which this court exercises free review.
See Fritts v. Liddle & Moeller Constr., Inc., 144 Idaho 171, 173, 158 P.3d 947, 949 (2007)
(“Whether a district court has correctly determined that a case is based on a ‘commercial
transaction’ for the purpose of I.C. § 12-120(3) is a question of law. . . . This Court exercises free
review over questions of law.”).
IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

The District Court Correctly Determined the Undisputed Value of the Partnership’s
Real Property was $600,000 as of the Date of Dissolution of the Partnership.
“[I]t is a general rule that when a partnership dissolves, its assets are to be valued as of the

time of dissolution.” Burnham v. Bray, 104 Idaho 550, 556, 661 P.2d 335, 341 (Ct. App. 1983);
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see also Wahlen v. Siaperas, 93 Idaho 265,267,460 P.2d 400,402 (1969) ("In an accounting upon
dissolution of a partnership, the assets should be appraised as of the date of dissolution."); Arnold

v. Burgess, 113 Idaho 786, 791, 747 P.2d 1315, 1320 (Ct. App. 1987) ("The ultimate goal of an
accounting is to ascertain the value of a plaintiffs interest in the partnership as of the date of
dissolution and then to determine any profits attributable to the use of the plaintiffs right in the
property of the dissolved partnership."). 4
The partnership dissolved on March 26, 2017. R. p. 367; R. p. 478. Guenther's expert,
Jody L. Bolopue with Integrity Appraisal & Consulting, Inc., straightaway appraised the Property
at $600,000, as of April 7, 2017. R. pp. 314-350. The appraisal included the land and all
improvements, including the home and vineyard. R. p. 315 ("Site improvements include fire
proof landscaping, sprinkler system, lawn, gravel driveway, grape vineyard (developing). Views
of the valley and foothills are excellent.").
Ryerson disputed the $600,000 value, and on November 17, 2017, Ryerson had her own
appraiser, Larkin Hall with Western Idaho Realty, inspect the Property. R. p. 571. However,
Ryerson failed to disclose any competing appraisal or expert disclosure regarding the Property
value. 5 Instead, in opposing Guenther's motion for summary judgment, Ryerson asserted that she,
as an owner of the Property could testify to its value. She opined in her declaration that, "It is my
opinion, as one of the owner's [sic] of the Property, that the Property is worth significantly more
than the appraisal that Guenther obtained in April of2017." R. at 407. In a subsequent declaration,

4

On appeal, Ryerson asserts, "the property's value at the time of dissolution is irrelevant under
the UPA in winding up a partnership's business." Appellant's Brief p. 38. This is a clear
misstatement of Idaho law and inconsistent with Ryerson's position on summary judgment that
the Property's value was at least $800,000 in March 2017. See R. p. 531 at ,r 19.
5

Notably, Ryerson's appraiser filed a declaration stating he inspected the vineyard on
November 17, 2018, but "could not provide an opinion as to the value of the vineyard as an
operating vineyard business." R. p. 572.
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Ryerson stated, "I have consulted real estate professionals in the area with expertise in selling
vineyard estate properties, and after pulling comps, these professionals agree with me that the
property can be listed and sold for much more than $600,000, and that the baseline asking
price for the property should be no lower than $800,000." R. pp. 470-71.
While Ryerson's first declaration discussed the vineyard on the Property and Ryerson's
sweat equity contributions in assisting Guenther with the vineyard planting and irrigation, Ryerson
did not express an opinion of value based on her knowledge concerning the Property-just that it
"is worth significantly more than" $600,000. R. pp. 406-414. In her subsequent declaration,
Ryerson relied on inadmissible hearsay communications with realtors who suggested the starting
asking price "should be no lower than $800,000." R. pp. 470-71. Most importantly, Ryerson's
declarations did not state an actual opinion as to the specific value of the Property and provided
no foundation other than communications with unidentified real estate professionals. It is also
worth noting that no evidence was offered regarding the time of dissolution.
The District Court has discretion to determine whether a lay witness may testify as to his
or her opinion regarding certain matters. See Evans v. Twin Falls Cty., 118 Idaho 210, 213-14,
796 P .2d 87, 90-91 (1990) ("The decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals, both before
and after the adoption of the Rules of Evidence in 1985, have held that the admission of opinion
testimony, particularly that of non-expert witnesses, rests in the sound discretion of the trial
judge"). Moreover, a "mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient
to create a genuine issue of material fact for the purposes of summary judgment." AED, Inc. v.
KDC Investments, LLC, 155 Idaho 159, 163, 307 P.3d 176, 180 (2013). Rather, in opposing

summary judgment, the non-moving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by her own
affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate

RESPONDENT AND CROSS-APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 13

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 324, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986); see also I.R.C.P. 56(c)(1)(A).
For these reasons, the District Court correctly determined the undisputed value of the
Property was $600,000 as of date of the partnership dissolution in March 2017, stating:
Plaintiff provided an accepted method of valuation and entered the
expert into evidence along with supporting exhibits that included
several comparable properties that aided in determining the
valuation of the Property. Defendant entered no admissible support
for her bare opinion the Plaintiff’s valuation was erroneous.
Essentially by offering only a bare opinion that the value must be
more than $600,000.00 without providing admissible support for
such opinion and to assert that the Property cannot have a value
without being sold, simply does not rise above the evidentiary
standard of presentation of more than a scintilla of evidence required
by the non-moving party at summary judgment.
R. pp. 487-88.
On appeal, Ryerson essentially argues the District Court should have ignored the standard
of review on summary judgment that requires the non-moving party to present more than a scintilla
of evidence in opposition. Instead, according to Ryerson, the District Court should have found an
issue of fact regarding valuation of the Property simply because Ryerson is presumed to have
competent testimony on the Property’s value since she is an owner. The Court did not, however,
suggest that a property owner could not testify to value, only that this property owner’s testimony
was not sufficient to create an issue of fact. Ryerson discusses at length several Idaho cases in
which owners testified at trial concerning the value of their personal and real property. See
Appellant’s Brief pp. 31-34 (discussing Rankin v. Caldwell, 15 Idaho 625 (1908); Weaver v. Vill.
of Bancroft, 92 Idaho 189, 439 P.2d 697 (1968); and Wartzburg v. Kootenai County, 155 Idaho
236, 308 P.3d 936 (Ct. App. 2013)). However, these cases simply stand for the general rule
acknowledged by the District Court that an owner of the property may testify concerning the
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property's fair market value. But, in each of these cases, the property owner, unlike Ryerson,
testified to a specific fair market value, identified the basis for their opinion, and had foundation
for that opinion. See, e.g., Weaver v. Vil!. of Bancroft, 92 Idaho at 191, 439 P.2d at 699 (stating
owner estimated his property's fair market value was $14,500 "based upon the amount of money
he had put in the place-costs and improvements."). In the cases cited by Ryerson, the property
owner supported his/her opinion. Ryerson, on the other hand, merely sought to relate alleged and
unverified opinions of other potentially qualified real estate professionals and the Court ruled that
it was not admissible for summary judgment. Evidence of this sort is tantamount to a litigant
speaking to expert and then paraphrasing the information as his or her own. Simply stated, the
lower court concluded this was not sufficient.
On summary judgment, Ryerson failed to present any admissible evidence on the actual
Property value as of the date of the partnership dissolution on March 26, 2017, and therefore her
speculative assertions that the Property must somehow be worth more than $600,000 and at least
$800,000, did not create an issue of fact. This Court should therefore affirm the District Court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of Guenther, determining that at dissolution, (1) the Property
value was $600,000, and (2) there was $144,789.92 in equity of the Property. 6 R. p. 488.

B.

Judicially Ordered Winding Up of a Partnership Should be Completed through the
Most Practical and Efficient Means to Settle the Partnership Affairs to Avoid Waste
and Preserve Equity in the Partnership Property.
A partnership is not terminated upon dissolution, but continues until the winding up of the

partnership affairs is completed. Arnold v. Burgess, 113 Idaho 786, 790, 747 P.2d 1315, 1319 (Ct.
App. 1987). The Idaho Uniform Partnership Act, Idaho Code § 30-23-101 et seq., governs the

6

The District Court found $144,789.92 in equity based on the undisputed evidence that the
outstanding balance on the Zions Bank loan encumbering the Property was $455,210.08 in March
2017. R. p. 352.
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winding up of a partnership’s business. Winding up is the process of settling partnership affairs
after dissolution, and it generally involves an accounting of the partnership’s assets. The goal of
an accounting is to ascertain the value of the partners’ interest in the partnership as of the date of
dissolution, and determine the existence of any profits or losses. Kelly v. Silverwood Estates, 127
Idaho 624, 629, 903 P.2d 1321, 1326 (1995) (citing Arnold, 113 Idaho at 791, 747 P.2d at 1320).
Idaho Code § 30-23-806 states in pertinent part:
§ 30-23-806. Disposition of assets in winding up--When
contributions required
(a) In winding up its business, a partnership shall apply its assets,
including the contributions required by this section, to discharge the
partnership's obligations to creditors, including partners that are
creditors.
(b) After a partnership complies with subsection (a) of this section,
any surplus must be distributed in the following order, subject to any
charging order in effect under section 30-23-504, Idaho Code:
(1) To each person owning a transferable interest that reflects
contributions made and not previously returned, an amount
equal to the value of the unreturned contributions; and
(2) Among partners in proportion to their respective rights to
share in distributions immediately before the dissolution of the
partnership, except to the extent necessary to comply with any
transfer effective under section 30-23-503, Idaho Code.
I.C. § 30-23-806(a),(b).
The first step in winding up a partnership’s business is to pay all partnership debts. I.C. §
30-23-806(a). After payment of debts, the partnership must next repay all capital contributions
made by partners. Contributions to the partnership must be repaid before distribution of any
partnership profits and must be returned to the partners pro rata up to the amount of their total
contribution. I.C. § 30-23-806(b)(1) (“To each person owning a transferable interest that reflects
contributions made and not previously returned, an amount equal to the value of the unreturned
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contributions."). Finally, if any funds remain after all partnership debts and partner contributions
are paid, then any remaining surplus is distributed to the partners based on their right to share in
distributions. 7
In winding up a partnership, the trial court may order the liquidation of the partnership's
assets by sale, and apply the proceeds of the sale to the partnership's liabilities according to the
priorities established in Idaho Code§ 30-23-806. Kelly, 127 at 628, 903 P.2d at 1325 ("Generally,
winding up is accomplished by an accounting and a liquidation of the partnership assets") (citing
59 Am.Jr.2d, Partnership § 1100).
1.

The District Court Correctly Recognized a Forced Sale on the Open Market
Would Result in Economic Waste of the Property.

In its February 16, 2018 decision granting Guenther's Motion to Reconsider the Order
granting Ryerson's Motion to Liquidate Partnership Assets, the District Court recognized a sale
on the open market would likely take at least a year due to the unique nature of the Property and
would "reduce the available equity in the Property through fees associated with any real property
sale." R. pp. 491-92.
As held on summary judgment, as of the date of dissolution, the Property had a value of
$600,000 and $144,789.92 in equity. R. p. 488; R. p. 780. Following trial, the District Court held
that Guenther's pro rata share of the equity (76%) was $110,040.34 and Ryerson's pro rata share
of the equity (24%) was $34,749.58. R. pp. 803-04. Typically, sellers of real property in Boise,

7

The District Court held that Guenther contributed a total of $330,163.22 to the partnership and
Ryerson contributed a total of $101,514.66 to the partnership. R. p. 797. As determined by the
District Court, the Parties' "combined total contributions to the partnership total $431,677.88. The
percentage of Guenther's contributions equal 76% while Ryerson's contributions equal 24 percent
as of the dissolution of the partnership at the end of March 2017." R. p. 797 at ,r 117. Because the
Parties had no written or oral agreement to the contrary, the District Court correctly held that any
surplus of partnership funds after payment of the Zions Bank debt would be distributed to Guenther
and Ryerson based on their "overall percentage of unreturned contributions." R. p. 783.
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Idaho pay a total brokerage fee of six percent (6%) of the purchase price. Therefore, a 6%
brokerage fee for a $600,000.00 property sale would reduce the available $144,789.92 in equity
by $36,000.00, for a total equity of $108,789.92. In that scenario, Ryerson’s pro rata share (24%)
of the equity at dissolution would be reduced from $34,749.58 to $26,109.58 and Guenther’s pro
rata share (76%) of the equity at dissolution would be reduced from $110,040.34 to $82,680.34.
That would be a significant waste of the partnership’s assets. There is no realistic explanation as
to why Ryerson would refuse to accept $34,749.58 and opt for a forced sale where she only obtains
$26,109.58, unless that is for the exclusive purpose of forcing Guenther from his home and
violating her duties to the partnership.
On July 2, 2018, the District Court entered a Clarification of Conclusions of Law,
Memorandum Decision Reconsidering Liquidation, which acknowledged that listing and selling
the Property on the open market would result in significant waste of the partnership’s assets:
While Ryerson still objects to the sale of the property to the other
partner, because the Court has completed the court trial, the Court
is in a better position to evaluate Ryerson’s objection and the effect
that a sale on the open market would have on the waste of the
partnership’s assets and the recovery of contributions. This
business venture has been a money pit. The parties contributed
$431,677.88 to accrue $144,789.92 in equity over eight years. Now,
Ryerson wants to incur brokerage fees plus the seller’s portion of
closing costs on behalf of the partnership to sell the property. Even
taking the 2017 value of $600,000.00, that seller’s portion of the real
estate fee at best would be a minimum of $18,000.00 (which the
court calculated at 3% assuming some offer might offer to cover the
buyer’s agent’s 3% of the fee), plus seller’s closing costs. Ryerson
would still pay her portion even as a dissociated partner since it is a
partnership expense for winding up the partnership.
***
[T]he Court finds allowing Guenther to purchase the property is in
the best interest of the partnership, the remaining partner, and the
partner that dissociated since Ryerson can only recover $34,749.58
under the Court’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law. Although
she believes the property’s value has escalated since the partnership
dissolved on March 26, 2017, the value of her interest was set at
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the time of dissolution and will not increase. However, the value
of her interest can decrease with the passage of time and the extra
costs of the sale on the open market and attorney fees. Therefore,
incurring additional partnership liabilities by retaining a sales agent,
paying closing costs, paying the mortgage and expenses to maintain
the real property until such sale, and paying additional attorney fees
wastes assets for both Ryerson and Guenther and unreasonably
prolongs the winding up.

R. pp. 773-75 (emphasis added).
Overall, a forced sale of the Property on the open market would delay the efficient winding
up of the partnership and result in significant waste of the partnership's equity in the Property, not
to mention displace Guenther from his home.

2.

Idaho Courts Have Approved Alternatives to Liquidation Where it is in the
Best Interest of the Partnership.

Ryerson incorrectly asserts Idaho law requires liquidation of partnership assets and
precludes any alternative means of winding up the partnership where one partner, like Ryerson,
demands liquidation. See Appellant's Brief pp. 18-22. Ryerson cites no authority that supports
this position. The notion that liquidation is the common or even most typical approach does not
support the position that liquidation is required even in the face of waste. As set forth in more
detail in Section IV.B.3. infra, Ryerson's position is untenable and inconsistent with case law. A
buyout ofRyerson's minority partnership interest is the most practical and efficient means to wind
up the partnership and will avoid significant waste of partnership assets that would result from a
sale of the Property on the open market.
While liquidation is often the most efficient and economical process, 8 Idaho Courts have
approved alternative distributions of partnership property when warranted by the circumstances of

8

Indeed, neither Party objected to the District Court's order that the partnership's other property,
a tractor and loader (R. p. 800 at 1 16), be sold at public auction. R. p. 806 at 1 16. On July 24,
2017, Pickett Auction Service sold the tractor and loader for $12,300. R. p. 873 at 1124-25.
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the case. For example, in Arnold, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed a winding up of a family
farm partnership in which the trial court entered a judgment against a partner to satisfy partnership
liabilities instead of a liquidation sale. Arnold, 113 Idaho at 794, 747 P.2d at 1323. The Court
noted that a "forced sale of partnership assets will often destroy a great part of the value of the
business and may prevent the continuation of a valuable source of livelihood for former partners."
Arnold, 113 Idaho at 793, 747 P.2d at 1322. 9 See also Kelly, 127 at 630, 903 P.2d at 1327 (in

upholding order of distribution of partnership assets in kind, the Idaho Supreme Court stated, "[t ]he
trial court could have plunged ahead and required a bargain basement sale of the property, but that
would have served no purpose except procedural nicety."). The holding of Arnold is in accord
with this case, in which an ongoing agricultural operation and Guenther's continued work on the
property since Ryerson abandoned the partnership would be frustrated in the event of a forced sale.
Similar to the analysis in Arnold, other jurisdictions have interpreted their partnership acts
to allow a withdrawing partner to be bought out after dissolution. These jurisdictions hold that,
while winding up generally has been equated with the sale of partnership assets, the statute does
not strictly require such a result. See, e.g., Nicholes v. Hunt, 273 Or. 255, 270, 541 P.2d 820, 827
(1975) (buyout permissible means of winding up partnership where compelled liquidation would
result in economic waste); Horne v. Aune, 130 Wash. App. 183, 195-96, 121 P.3d 1227, 1233-34
(2005) (holding Washington's Revised Uniform Partnership Act, which expressly references the
"liquidation of partnership assets," does not require a forced sale but rather guarantees partners
receive the fair value of their property interest upon dissolution); Disotell v. Stiltner, 100 P.3d 890

9

While the analysis in Arnold is based on the former Idaho Uniform Partnership Act, which was
repealed, the new Act is substantively the same.
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(Alaska 2004) (affirming trial court’s order permitting a partner to buy out his partner’s interest in
lieu of compelled liquidation).
For example, in Disotell, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed a trial court’s order
permitting a partner to buy out his partner’s interest in lieu of compelled liquidation. Disotell, 100
P.3d at 893-94. Disotell involved a partnership between a contractor, Disotell, and a real estate
agent, Stiltner, to develop a hotel on property owned by Stiltner. Stiltner sued for dissolution and
winding up. Instead of ordering a forced sale of the property, the trial court gave Stiltner the option
of purchasing Disotell’s partnership interest as a means of winding up the partnership. Id. at 94.
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Alaska’s Uniform Partnership Act does not
compel liquidation and forbid a buyout. Id. A buyout option reduced economic waste by avoiding
the transaction costs of a forced sale, and it also guaranteed Disotell a fair value for his partnership
interest. As the court explained:
Even though there was no ongoing business, the superior court noted
that the expense of a sale could total as much as twelve percent of
the property's value. This was a valid reason and potentially
benefitted both partners. The potential savings were significant. The
court's effort to avoid further loss to both partners justifies its
decision to offer Stiltner the buyout option. Further, properly
conducted, a buyout guaranteed Disotell a fair value for his
partnership interest. Liquidation exposed Disotell to the risk that no
buyer would offer to pay fair market value for the property. A
liquidation sale in which no other buyers participated might have
given Stiltner an opportunity to buy the property for less than fair
market value, to Disotell's disadvantage.
Id.
In sum, where the partners cannot agree on how to best wind up the partnership, the court
should order the most practical and efficient means to settle the partnership assets. In this case,
permitting Guenther to refinance the partnership’s mortgage loan solely in his name and pay Ryerson
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$34,749.58 to buy out her partnership interest would accomplish that goal. To force a sale on the open
market, would, like in Kelly, serve no "purpose except procedural nicety."
3.

The District Court Erred in Requiring Compliance with Idaho Code § 30-23703(c) and Ordering Sale of the Property on the Open Market Resulting in
Significant Waste on the Partnership.

Guenther has appealed the Amended Order and whether the District Court erred "in
requiring compliance with Idaho Code § 30-23-703(c) regarding dissociation of a single partner,
including the requirement to obtain 'agreement of a creditor,' for sale of partnership real property
to a partner during the winding up and liquidation of a partnership following dissolution."
Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal at p. 2. Guenther also appealed whether the District Court erred
"in ordering the sale of partnership real property on the open market to a third party where such
sale would result in significant waste on the partnership." Id. Stated simply, the District Court
misapplied a dissociation statute to a dissolution case, and in so doing, perceived that the
partnership lender was required to consent to a refinance justifying acknowledged waste on the
partnership.
On July 2, 2018, District Court entered its Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
(the "Amended Order"), providing a mechanism by which Guenther could purchase the Property
"from the partnership by July 31, 2018 by a refinance with Zions Bank ... " R. p. 804. The District
Court stated, "[ a]ny financing of the property must completely satisfy the partnership's entire debt
to Zions Bank and result in termination of the deed of trust in Joseph Guenther and Michelle
Ryerson's names." R. p. 804 at ,r 10. The District Court also required Guenther to "file with the
Court the real property appraisal" obtained by Zions Bank "before the Court will give its final
order for sale of the property to Joseph Guenther." R. p. 805 at ,r 12.
After entry of the Court's Amended Order on July 2, 2018, Guenther worked diligently
with Zions Bank to close his loan refinance. R. 869-73 at ,r,r 6-17. On July 2, 2018, the same date
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as the Court's Amended Order, counsel for Guenther filed a declaration attaching the real property
appraisal obtained by Zions Bank that stated an appraised value of $725,000 (as of February 28,
2018). R. pp. 815-45. However, the District Court delayed entering its Order for Sale for eleven
days until July 13, 2018. R. p. 861. At that point, Guenther had only eighteen days to close his
purchase of the Property by July 31, 2018. This resulted in a very tight schedule for Zions Bank
and Guenther to finalize underwriting of the loan financing. R. p. 870-71 at ,-r,-r 8-17.
When Zions Bank chose not to proceed with the financing late in the process, Guenther
immediately contacted Guild Mortgage on July 26, 2018 to obtain alternative financing. Guenther
R. p. 872 at ,-r,-r 17-18. Zions Bank assisted by forwarding Guenther's full loan package, including
his credit report and the Property appraisal, to Guild Mortgage. R. p. 872 at ,-r 18.
On July 30, 2018, Guenther filed a Motion for Amended Order for Sale of Property,
requesting a two-week extension of the District Court's July 31, 2018 deadline to close his
purchase of the Property. R. pp. 863-68. In actuality, Guenther was prepared to close on the sale
on August 9, 2018-only a nine-day delay. R. p. 889 at ,-r 7. The hearing on the requested
extension was August 8, 2018. As of the date of the hearing, Guild Mortgage was ready to close
the next day if the Court granted the modest extension. Unfortunately, the Court denied the time
extension request necessitating protracted litigation and this appeal. Aug. 8, 2018 Tr. at 15:3-16.
Guenther filed a Motion to Reconsider, which the District Court also denied. R. p. 908. Sept. 9,
2018 Tr. at 16:17-17:3. Despite Ryerson's assertions to the contrary, 10 there is no evidence in the
record that Guenther would not have closed on his purchase of the Property on August 9, 2018,
but for the Court's ruling.

10

See Appellant's Brief, pp. 8, 10and11.
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In denying Guenther's Motion for Amended Order for Sale, and in reliance on Idaho Code
§ 30-23-703, the Court held that Zions Bank, as a creditor of the partnership, did not consent to
financing with Guild Mortgage that would discharge Ryerson from the partnership's current debt
obligation to Zions Bank. At the hearing on Guenther's Motion, the Court ruled as follows:
Moving from Zions Bank, who had previously indicated in this
litigation that it did not object to the refinance as a creditor of the
partnership, to remove Zions Bank and substitute Guild Mortgage
circumvents this Court's orders and its prior orders on the
reconsideration.
Because what I had actually reconsidered was the record before the
Court, what was actually filed. And this is not a matter of simply
changing Zions Bank to Guild Mortgage and changing a date in the
Court's order. This is actually introducing another lending scheme
without any indication in the record about whether Zions Bank,
which is the creditor of the partnership, has evaluated or would
oppose this scheme. And it would actually alter the record of the
litigation even after trial.
And so because of that, I am not going to change my previous order.
Because of that, Mr. Guenther's time to actually purchase the
property under the Court's order has now expired.
Aug. 8, 2018 Tr. at 14:22-15:16. This ruling was quite clearly a misunderstanding and
misapplication of Idaho law and how mortgages operate once paid off. The Guild Mortgage loan
that Guenther was obtaining in his own name would have paid off the Zions debt, thus discharging
that mortgage and the obligation of the partnership.
Chapter 23 (General Partnerships) of Title 30 (Corporations) contains the Idaho Uniform
Partnership Act ("Partnership Act"). The Partnership Act consists of nine Parts, including Part 6
(Dissociation), Part 7 (Partner's Dissociation when Business Not Wound up) and Part 8
(Dissolution and Winding up). Part 7 specifically addresses the situation where "a person is
dissociated as a partner without the dissociation resulting in a dissolution and winding up of the
partnership business under section 30-23-801, Idaho Code ... " LC.§ 30-23-701 (emphasis added).
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Therefore, Part 7 of Chapter 23 (which contains Idaho Code § 30-23-703), is not applicable here
where the partnership has dissolved and is in the process of winding up.
However, the District Court mistakenly applied Idaho Code § 30-23-703 to this case,
stating Idaho law provides "a means for the partnership to transfer a partner's property under Idaho
Code § 30-23-703( c) to ensure that a dissociated partner is not liable for debts obtained before the
dissolution." R. p. 491; see also R. p. 799 at ,-r 12 ("While this Court does not have the power to
direct a partner to assume all debts and cannot determine the rights of any non-party creditor, Idaho
Code § 30-23-703(c) provides a means for a partner to consent to assume debts or for the
partnership to transfer liabilities to any remaining partner in order to ensure a dissociated partner
is not required to repay debts obtained during the partnership.").
Idaho Code § 30-23-703 is not applicable to this case because the partnership is dissolved
and is in the process of winding up. However, even if the partnership were not dissolved and
winding up, the District Court's Amended Order does not contemplate Guenther (or Ryerson)
assuming the Zions Bank note (i.e. a novation). 11 Instead, the District Court ordered that "[a]ny
financing of the Property must completely satisfy the partnership's entire debt to Zions Bank and
result in termination of the deed of trust in Joseph Guenther and Michelle Ryerson's names" (R.

11

However, from the Court's comments at oral argument, it appears the District Court mistakenly
believed that Guenther initially sought to assume the current Zions Bank loan secured by the
Property, which is not the case. See Aug. 8, 2018 Tr. at 14 ("that one was actually an assumption
of the loan"). The record is clear that Guenther never proposed to assume the Parties' mortgage
loan with Zions Bank. All of the loan financing proposed by Guenther (first with Zions and then
with Guild) were clearly refinanced debt-new loans with different interest rates and other terms
compared to the Parties' current mortgage loan with Zions Bank. Compare R. p. 915 (Parties' Note
with Zions Bank dated July 28, 2015 borrowing $460,000 at 3.875% interest) with R. p. 397
(Conditional Approval and Pre-qualification Letter from Zions Bank to Guenther dated January 9,
2018, approving Guenther to borrow $448,000 at 4.125%); R. p. 740 (Zions Bank Loan Estimate
dated May 22, 2018 for Guenther to borrow $580,000 at 4.5%); and R. p. 893 (Guild Mortgage
Company Closing Disclosure dated August 3, 2018, and setting closing date of August 9, 2018,
for Guenther to borrow $444,000 at 4.5%).
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p. 804 at ,r 10) and expressly allowed Guenther to "refinance" the debt. Amended R. p. 804 at ,r
8. Through Guenther's refinancing the partnership's debt with Guild Mortgage, the Zions Bank
loan would be paid in full, and Guenther would then be solely responsible for the debt. See
REFINANCING, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (refinancing is an "exchange of an old
debt for a new debt" by "repaying the existing loan with money acquired by a new loan.").
Whether the Zions Bank loan obligation is paid with cash through a loan obtained by
Guenther or a third party buyer following listing of the Property on the open market, the result is
exactly the same-Zions Bank is paid in full for the outstanding loan obligation owed by Guenther
and Ryerson. It is therefore irrelevant whether Guenther obtains financing from Zions Bank or
another lender to repay the partnership's debt owed to Zions Bank. The partnership's debt owed
to Zions Bank (and deed of trust security) will be extinguished as soon as the amounts owed are
paid. This is in accord with the promissory note executed by the Parties (the "Note"). R. pp. 91518. The Note provides that the Parties have the right to prepay the entire loan prior to its maturity
without paying a prepayment charge. R. p. 916 at

,r 5.

Nowhere in the Note does Zions Bank

require its consent before either party may pay the full amount owed under the Note.
Ryerson has taken the position that if Idaho Code § 30-23-703 is inapplicable to this case,
there is no legal basis to allow Guenther to purchase the Property from the partnership, and
therefore the Court must order liquidation of the Property on the open market despite any resulting
waste. Ryerson argues, "the District Court's economic waste concerns are merely speculative and
regard the normal costs associated with selling property" and that any concerns for waste do not
warrant ignoring "the long-standing rule favoring liquidation and the sale of property." See
Appellant's Briefp. 23. Ryerson's position urges this Court to disregard the purpose of the Idaho
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Uniform Partnership Act, displace Guenther from his home and require that Ryerson obtain less
in proceeds from the partnership purely out of animosity.
Here, two partners, who were unable to come to an agreement on how to wind up their
dissolved partnership, sought a judicial solution. The District Court was then placed in the position
to effect the best method to liquate the partnership's assets, taking into account the time and cost
for the liquidation. While liquidation through a third-party sale is certainly a common means to
wind up a partnership, as set forth above, Idaho Courts have approved alternative distributions of
partnership property.
In addition, judicial actions involving the dissolution of a partnership and the winding up
of its affairs are proceedings in equity. in which trial courts have discretion in achieving a fair
accounting between the parties involved. See Arnold, 113 Idaho at 790-91, 747 P.2d at 1319-20
("An accounting is an equitable proceeding for comprehensive investigation of transactions and
adjudication of the rights of the partners."); Havelick v. Chobot, 123 Idaho 714, 718, 851 P.2d
1010, 1014 (Ct. App. 1993) ("an accounting is generally held to be an equitable proceeding,
designed to comprehensively investigate partnership transactions and adjudicate the rights of the
partners.") (citing Arnold); see also 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 492.
As the District Court specifically held, a sale on the open market would likely take at least
a year due to the unique nature of the Property and would cause the partnership to incur thousands
of dollars in realtor and closing fees. The use of the Idaho partnership statutes to force waste on
the partnership is improper and contrary to the Court's obligation in winding up a dissolved
partnership. Therefore, this Court should hold the District Court erred (1) in requiring Zions Bank
consent to Guenther's refinance of the mortgage loan on the Property and buyout of Ryerson's
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$34,749.58 equity in the Property, and (2) erred in ordering sale of the Property on the open market,
resulting in significant waste on the partnership.

C.

The District Court Correctly Held Ryerson Failed to Prove her Counterclaim
Alleging an Oral Agreement for a 50/50 Split of the Partnership Ownership and
Profits.
In response to the allegations and claims set forth in Guenther's Complaint, Ryerson

counterclaimed, alleging the existence of an oral partnership agreement that each partner owns a
50% interest. R. p. 107-113. Specifically, Ryerson alleged the Parties "do not have a written
partnership agreement pertaining to ownership of either the Property or West Foothills. However,
the parties agreed that the ownership interest between the parties would be a 50/50 split, which is
reflected in their oral agreement with each other and tax returns." R. p. 110 at ,r,r 7-8.
Following the court trial, the District Court dismissed Ryerson's counterclaim, stating:
As to Ryerson' s Counterclaim claiming that the oral agreement was that
partnership profits were to be split 50:50 based on tax deductions claimed
or the form of ownership of the real property, Ryerson has failed to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that Ryerson actually paid fifty percent
of the expenses of the partnership or that Ryerson and Guenther even had
an agreement that she would pay fifty percent of the expenses of the
partnership. Based upon this failure and considering the application of the
UPA above, Ryerson's Counterclaim is DISMISSED.
R. p. 803 at i-f 37.
On Appeal, Ryerson asserts the District Court erred in dismissing her Counterclaim
because during the court trial Ryerson testified that the parties had an oral agreement that "the
partnership ownership percentage would be a 50/50 split" and that "the tax returns for the
partnership evidence that each partners' share was 50 percent." Appellant's Brief p. 35; see also
Trial Tr. at 183:15-184:20.
Ryerson asserts Guenther's trial testimony supports her Counterclaim, but this is not the
case. While Guenther acknowledged that he stated the ownership was 50/50 in the partnership's
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tax returns so that Ryerson could benefit from the tax savings, he also testified that he contacted
the IRS about structuring the tax returns in this manner, and that it was permitted by the IRS even
though it did not reflect an the actual ownership split. Trial Tr. at 142:7-143:19; 147:18-148:11.
Therefore, the District Court was correct in making the following findings of fact:
11. Although Ryerson' s testimony at trial was that the partnership
agreement was a 50:50 ownership percentage, she also testified as
the agreement as to allocating partnership expenses between the
partners. Her testimony was, "Joe understood where my financial
commitments already were, and his response to me is, "It's okay.
We're in this together, and we'll work it out.. .. And I would make
payments. If he asked me to make a payment, I would .... But
anytime that he asked me to make a payment, I would." 12

12. While Guenther testified in a 2012 deposition," ... As far as you
know, you each own a 50 percent share in the [real] property," and
answered, "Yes," that question was related to the form of ownership
of the real property and whether they were joint tenants in common.
This testimony did not address the partnership agreement related to
contributions, expenses and profits of the partnership. 13
13. Additionally, Guenther and Ryerson each filed tax returns in
2011 to 2016 with a Schedule F, Profit and Loss from Farming,
which could have been filed as a K-1 showing the partnership
contributions were fifty percent each for tax purposes or were eighty
percent by Guenther and twenty percent by Ryerson. The Parties
agreed to file taxes showing each had made contributions of fifty
percent so that Ms. Ryerson could gain more favorable tax
treatment. 14
14. The Court finds the agreement related to claiming tax deductions
or the form of ownership of the real property do not show by a
preponderance of the evidence that Ryerson had actually paid fifty
percent of the expenses of the partnership or that Ryerson and
Guenther even had an agreement that she would pay fifty percent of
the expenses of the partnership.

12

Trial Tr. at 184:1-15.

13

Trial Tr. at 145:7-23.

14

Trial Tr. at 142:7-143:19; 147:18-148:11.
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15. Since there was no written agreement for the Partnership or oral
agreement to the contrary, Idaho Code§ 30-23-806 governs and first
requires partnership funds to discharge debts and liabilities to nonparty creditors, and then, a) if remaining funds are insufficient to
cover all partner contributions, then Guenther and Ryerson will
receive only the portion of the remaining funds reflexive of his or
her overall percentage of unreturned contributions, or, b) if funds
remain after all liabilities and partner contributions are paid, then
any remaining surplus is distributed to Guenther and Ryerson based
upon their percentage interest.
R. pp. 782-83 at i-fi-f 11-15.
These findings of fact (and the resulting conclusion of law that Ryerson failed to prove her
Counterclaim) are supported by substantial and competent evidence and should not be overturned.
See Green River Ranches, LLC v. Silva Land Co., LLC, 162 Idaho 385,389,397 P.3d 1144, 1148

(2017) (citations omitted) (stating only "erroneous findings" of fact will be set aside on appeal).
D.

The District Court Correctly Credited Guenther for any Increase in the Equity of the
Property Following Dissolution.

At the court trial, the Parties testified to their respective out-of-pocket and sweat equity
contributions to the partnership up through March 26, 2017, the date of the partnership dissolution.
R. pp. 783-97. After the partnership dissolved and Ryerson moved out of the home on the Property,
Guenther continued living in the home as his personal residence. R. p. 792-793 at

,r,r 77-78.

Guenther has paid the mortgage, insurance, and maintenance for the Property in its entirety since
May 2017. 15 R. p. 291 at

,r 9; R. p.

787 at

,r 47.

Guenther has also continued to care for and

develop the vineyard on the Property, which is a long-term investment. R. p. 187 at i-fl 6; R. p. 787
at ,r 48. See also R. p. 4 78 ("Guenther currently resides at the home on the Property and has paid
the bills and upkeep on the Property since May 2017. Guenther plans to continue to operate the

The monthly mortgage payment to Zions Bank is $2,972. R. p. 786 at ,r 41. Therefore, from
May 2017 to May 2019, Guenther has made twenty-four $2,972 payments totaling $71,328.
15
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vineyard business from the Property and has completed a continuing education course in vineyard
operations.").

Ryerson's position that she could abandon the partnership, pay no expenses,

contribute in no way and require that Guenther pay the mortgage but still realize equity from the
property since her abandonment of the partnership is nonsensical.
Therefore, the District Court correctly held that any increase in the Property's equity since
March 2017 is solely attributable to Guenther. R. p. 793 at 180.
E.

The District Court Erred in Denying Guenther, as the Prevailing Party, Attorneys'
Fees Pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3).

Idaho Code§ 12-120(3), provides: "[i]n any civil action to recover on ... any commercial
transaction unless otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs." LC. § 12-120(3).
Commercial transaction is broadly "defined to mean all transactions except transactions for
personal or household purposes." Id. Whether a party can recover attorneys' fees under Idaho
Code § 12-120(3) depends on whether the gravamen of a claim is a commercial transaction.
Stevens v. Eyer, 161 Idaho 407,410, 387 P.3d 75, 78 (2016).

"A gravamen is the material or significant part of a grievance or complaint." Sims v.
Jacobson, 157 Idaho 980, 342 P.3d 907, 912 (2014)). Courts must analyze the gravamen on a

claim-by-claim basis. Id. "To determine whether the significant part of a claim is a commercial
transaction, the court must analyze whether a commercial transaction (1) is integral to the claim
and (2) constitutes the basis of the party's theory ofrecovery on that claim." Id.
This Court has stated that Idaho Code section 12-120(3) applies
when "the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the
lawsuit." Brower v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 117 Idaho 780,
784, 792 P.2d 345, 349 (1990). However, we have interpreted that
rule to require courts to consider the gravamen of each claim within
the lawsuit. Willie v. Bd. of Trs., 138 Idaho 131, 136, 59 P.3d 302,
307 (2002) ("When various statutory and common law claims are
separable, a court should bifurcate the claims and award fees
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pursuant to § 12-120(3) only on the commercial transaction.");
Brooks v. Gigray Ranches, Inc., 128 Idaho 72, 79,910 P.2d 744, 751
(1996) ("The allegation of a contract of the type covered in LC. §
12-120(3) was sufficient to award fees, even though the claim was
combined with other theories that would not have triggered
application of the statute."). When a lawsuit has multiple claims,
courts look at each individual claim to determine what statutory
basis allows attorney fees recovery on that claim. Willie, 13 8 Idaho
at 136, 59 P.3d at 307.

Sims v. Jacobson, 157 Idaho 980,342 P.3d at 911-12 (emphasis added). See also DAFCO LLC v.
Stewart Title Guar. Co., 156 Idaho 749, 758, 331 P.3d 491, 500 (2014) (noting that "even where
no commercial transaction occurs between the parties, [the Idaho Supreme Court] ha[s] allowed
attorney fees to a prevailing party where the losing party has alleged a commercial transaction
between the parties") (emphasis added).
Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) mandates an award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party
in a suit involving a commercial transaction. Here, Guenther is the prevailing party, as determined
by the District Court. 16 R. p. 939; see also R. p. 940 (awarding Guenther $830.15 in costs as a
matter of right). Guenther, as Plaintiff, asserted claims for (1) Dissolution (Count One) ("asking
the court to order dissolution of the partnership with Plaintiff having an eighty percent interest and
Defendant having a twenty-percent interest in the partnership property") (R. pp. 16-17; R. p. 779)
and (2) Declaratory Judgment (Count Four) ("a claim for Declaratory Judgment to quiet title to
the property and that the property may be sold in winding up the partnership"). 17 R. p. 19; R. p.
780. Ryerson asserted one Counterclaim ("seeking judicial dissolution averring that there was an
oral partnership agreement and tax returns so the Court should order that each party owns fiftypercent of the partnerships"). R. p. 110-11; R. p. 780.

16

Ryerson did not appeal the District Court's holding that Guenther is the prevailing party.

17

Guenther also alternatively asserted claims for unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel. R.
pp. 17-18; R. pp. 779-80.
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While the District Court correctly determined Guenther was the prevailing party because
"it found in favor of the Plaintiff on Counts, One, Four and on the Counterclaim," (R. p. 939) the
District Court entirely failed to separately address the gravamen of each of these claims, as required
by Idaho law. Instead, the District Court denied Guenther's requested fees, stating with a broadbrush, "[b ]ecause the gravamen of the lawsuit was the dissolution of the partnership under the
[Idaho Partnership Act], the Court finds attorney's fees are not appropriate." R. p. 942.
While the parties both sought dissolution and winding up of their partnership, much of the
case, driven by Ryerson' s Counterclaim, focused on the parties' alleged oral agreement concerning
their partnership, and therefore, as set forth below, attorneys' fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3)
should be awarded to Guenther on those claims based on a commercial transaction.
1.

Guenther Count One - Statutory Dissolution under UPA

In the first cause of action of Guenther's Amended Complaint, Guenther sought statutory
dissolution and winding up of the partnership under the UPA. See R. pp. 63-64. Guenther asserted,
based on the Parties' financial records, that Guenther had contributed eighty percent (80%) of the
partnership expenses and Ryerson had contributed twenty percent (20%) of the partnership
expenses, which reflected their ownership split in the partnership. R. p. 64 at ,r 31.
Guenther admits the gravamen of this claim is statutory dissolution under the UP A, and
not a commercial transaction. See Kelly v. Silverwood Estates, 127 Idaho 624,631,903 P.2d 1321,
1328 (1995) (denying attorney fees under Idaho Code 12-120(3) because the gravamen of the
claim was an effort to enforce a statutory scheme of dissolution). However, as set forth below, had
Ryerson not brought her Counterclaim for an oral partnership agreement, asserting she was entitled
to 50% of the profits (and in tum arguing the Property's value at the time of dissolution exceeded
$600,000, so there would be additional equity for a distribution of profits after repayment of all
capital contributions), the case would have involved a straightforward statutory dissolution and
RESPONDENT AND CROSS-APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 33

winding up of the partnership. Instead, Ryerson's factually and legally untenable positions in
support of her Counterclaim significantly increased the incurred attorneys' fees and delayed
resolution of the dispute.
2.

Guenther Count Four - Declaratory Judgment to Quiet Title

The Idaho Supreme Court has held "an action for interpretation or enforcement of
provisions of a commercial transaction relationship or declaration of rights therein falls within
[Idaho Code § 12-120(3)]." Idaho Transp. Dep 't v. Ascorp, Inc., 159 Idaho 138, 141, 357 P.3d
863, 866 (2015) (emphasis added). In Ascorp, the Court held that because the ITD's declaratory
judgment action against a contractor to determine rights of the parties with respect to a contract
for highway construction services was a dispute involving commercial transaction, the contractor
was entitled to award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) as the prevailing party.
Ascorp, 159 Idaho at 141, 357 P.3d at 866 ("We hold that the district court did not err in
determining that the gravamen of ITD's declaratory judgment action seeking enforcement of
contractual provisions concerned a commercial transaction for the purpose of section 12-120(3).").
In this case, Guenther sought a Declaratory Judgment to quiet the title of the Property and
that the Property may be sold (or purchased by one of the partners) in winding up the partnership.
R. p. 66 (Count 4). When the parties purchased the Property in 2009, the Warranty Deed conveyed
the real property to "Joseph Guenther and Michelle G. Ryerson, unmarried persons." R. p. 783 at

,r

17. The purchase of the Property was for business, and not personal purposes, and therefore

involved a commercial transaction. Therefore, like in As corp, Inc., Guenther sought declaratory
judgment related to a commercial transaction between the parties. Overall, the gravamen of this
claim was based on a commercial transaction, and therefore Guenther, as the prevailing party, is
entitled to his attorneys' fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3).
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3.

Ryerson Counterclaim - Oral Partnership Agreement for 50/50 Profit Split

As set forth in more detail in Section IV. C., supra, Ryerson asserted a Counterclaim that
the Parties had an oral agreement that they would each have a 50 percent ownership in the
partnership and split all profits 50/50. R. p. 110-11.
The District Court broadly held that the "gravamen of the lawsuit was the dissolution of
the partnership" under the UPA, and therefore attorneys' fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) is not
appropriate. R. p. 942 (citing Kelly v. Silverwood Estates, 127 Idaho 624, 631, 903 P.2d 1321,
1328 (1995)). In Kelly, the plaintiffs, David and Annette Kelly, filed an action for decree of
partnership dissolution, formal accounting, winding up of partnership affairs, and distribution of
assets.

The defendant, Silverwood, alleged the Kellys had no equity in the partnership at

dissolution and counterclaimed for damages related to the Kelly's post-dissolution use of
partnerships assets. Kelly, 127 Idaho at 627, 903 P.2d at 1324. The court determined Silverwood,
was the prevailing party entitled to costs, but that Silverwood was not entitled to attorney fees
under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) because the gravamen "was an effort to enforce a statutory scheme
of dissolution" and not a commercial transaction. Id. at Idaho 624, 630-21, 903 P.2d at 1327-28.
However, unlike the claims in Kelly, Ryerson's Counterclaim, focused on the Parties'
alleged oral partnership agreement. An oral agreement related to a business venture is clearly a
commercial transaction. See, e.g., Johnson v. Crossett, 163 Idaho 200, 408 P.3d 1272 (2018). In

Johnson, purported members of a limited liability company (LLC) sued the sole member alleging
he improperly expelled them from the LLC and breached his fiduciary duties as a member and
manager of the LLC. Following a bench trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the
sole member and granted his attorney fees under Idaho Code 12-120(3). On appeal, the purported
members asserted that because each of their claims were based on a statutory theory of recovery
under the Idaho Uniform Limited Liability Act, attorney's fees should not have been awarded
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under Idaho Code §12-120(3). In analyzing the fee award, the Idaho Supreme Court found that,
unlike Kelly, where the gravamen was enforcement of a statutory provision, the gravamen of the
action in Johnson was a dispute between individuals for a claimed contractual breach-the oral
agreement-which was a commercial transaction.
Like the LLC members in Johnson, Ryerson's briefing in this case, and her testimony at
trial, attempted to prove and enforce an alleged oral partnership agreement for a 50/50 split of
partnership profits-a commercial transaction that was integral to her Counterclaim. Therefore,
the gravamen of Ryerson's Counterclaim was a commercial transaction, and Guenther is entitled
to an award of attorneys' fees as the prevailing party.
V.

REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL

Idaho Appellate Rule 40(a) provides that "[c]osts shall be allowed as a matter of course to
the prevailing party unless otherwise provided by law or order of the Court." As the prevailing
party, Guenther is entitled to his costs on appeal. See id. In addition, I.A.R. 41 allows for an award
of attorneys' fees on appeal. Guenther requests his attorneys' fees on appeal as a prevailing party
under LC. § 12-120(3).
VI.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Guenther respectfully requests this Court affirm the District
Court's grant of summary judgment finding the value of the partnership's real Property was
$600,000, as of the date of dissolution, and affirm the District Court's dismissal of Ryerson's
Counterclaim. Guenther further requests this Court award him attorneys' fees as the prevailing
party in the District Court and on appeal, find the District Court erred in ordering sale of the
Property on the open market, and rule the District Court must enter an Order allowing Guenther
sufficient time to undertake all necessary actions to refinance the partnership's mortgage debt, as
long as Ryerson is released from the debt and paid $34,749.58.
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